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COMMENTARIES
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: LEGAL LIMITATIONS
ON METHODS AND GOALS
C. Benjamin Moya*
Roberta Achtenberg**
I. The Nonscientific Manipulation of Behavior
It is often assumed-in both the professional and popular literature-that
behavior modification is a creature from 1984' that has arrived too soon. This
misconception overlooks the fact that behavior modification is in reality characteristic of life itself.2 All living creatures modify their behavior in response to
physical and social influences from their environment and have done so since time
began. Man also modifies his behavior in response to the forces and influences
of his environment.' Additionally, men modify each other's behavior by interacting with each other and by building social institutions whose functions are to
limit and thereby control the behavior of men to promote the common good.4
Schools, churches, and military training camps are but a few examples.
Widespread aversion to the scientific manipulation of behavior with its
capacity for taking man unwillingly or unknowingly "beyond freedom and
dignity"5 has caused us to overlook the equally important and much more pervasive manipulation of human behavior by informal, nonscientific methods.'
This oversight has permitted nonscientific manipulation of behavior in the name
of therapy, rehabilitation, criminal punishment, or education, with little social
scrutiny and without clearly articulated goals.'
Suppose a trained behavioral scientist with a "depraved heart" were in
charge of a modem juvenile justice system and proposed to treat those adjudged
delinquent by positively reinforcing antisocial conduct and punishing socially
conforming conduct. Suppose further that this scientist decided to use peer
group approval as the positive reinforcer and peer group disapproval as the
punishment. A hue and cry would of course arise from all segments of the community over both the objectives of the "treatment" program and the methods
proposed to achieve those objectives. Yet as a society we have unwittingly put
Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law.
Student instructor in Sex Discrimination and third year student at the University of
Utah College of Law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Richard Delgado, Assistant Professor of Law, Arizona State University, in each phase of the preparation of this article.
1 See G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949) for a fictional account of the horrors of a future
society in which human beings become indistinguishable from machines.
2 See, e.g., B. F. SKINNER, BEYON) FREEDOM AND DIGNrrY 1-82 (1971) for a classicif somewhat extreme-exposition of the thesis that much of human behavior is the product
of social or environmental conditioning.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 30-33, 38-40, 115-25, 135-82.
5 The phrase was first coined by B. F. Skinner in his classic book on behaviorism, see
note 2 supra.
6 See text accompanying notes 8-21 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 8-14, 16-19 infra.
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such a "treatment" program into effect in many-probably most-of the juvenile
systems in this country.
In 1966, an article appeared in a professional journal that received little
attention outside a small circle of psychologists.8 It described a series of behavioral studies conducted in a detention home for delinquent girls. After carefully observing the daily activities of the residents, the authors concluded that the
peer group rather than the staff provided the most effective behavior modifiers.'
The delinquent peer group generally provided "massive schedules of positive
reinforcement for deviant behavior and negative reinforcement or punishment
for socially conforming behavior."'" Overwhelming positive reinforcement existed for rule breaking, criticizing adults and adult rules, behaving aggressively,
and doing things "for kicks.""- Compared with the reinforcement provided by
the staff, peer group reinforcement was much more frequent, consistent, and
effective in producing behavioral change." Adult staff members tended to reinforce indiscriminately and therefore ineffectively. They appeared more concerned with conforming behavior to custodial or security requirements than with
improving social attitudes.' The net effect (however unintentional) of confinement was to convert juvenile offenders, including truants and runaways, into
severe criminal offenders.' 4
Similarly, persons committed to institutions for the mentally ill find they are
often reinforced for socially dysfunctional behavior.' An extreme example is the
conditions at Partlow State Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, immediately prior
to the decision in Wyatt v. Stickney.16 Reciting the findings of a prior hearing
the Wyatt court described the hospital as a "warehousing institution... wholly
incapable of furnishing [habilitation] . . . and . . . conducive only to the deterioration and debilitation of the residents."" The most comprehensive testimony on prevailing conditions at Partlow was furnished by an expert witness who
testified that the environment tended "to develop behaviors which would interfere with successful community functioning."' 8 He found the conditions "dehumanizing" and declared that they fostered parasitism and helplessness among
the residents.' 9 In short, the patients of Partlow were being subjected to behavior
modification that proceeded unaware of or indifferent to the actual behavioral
traits being reinforced.
These reports are significant because they demonstrate in behavioral terms
what many already knew or suspected: our detention facilities frequently maintain and intensify the very attitudes and behaviors for which individuals are
Beuhler, Patterson & Furniss, The Reinforcement of Behavior in InstitutionalSettings,
157 (1966).
9 Id. at 162-63.
10 Id. at 157.
11 Id. at 158.
12 Id. at 164.
13 Id. at 161.
14 Id. at 158.
15 E.g., A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 261 et seq. (1969)
[hereinafter cited as BANDURA].
8

4

BEHAVIOR RESEARCH & THERAPY

16

344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

17

Id. at 391.

18

Id. at 391 n.7.

19

Id.
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institutionalized.2" Institutions which control many or most of their residents'
reinforcers cannot avoid significantly affecting their behavior.2 ' The central
issue is not whether the behavior of those who are detained can or will be subjected to modification by the state but what behavior modification should be
permitted. The realization that behavioral control inevitably occurs in such
settings helps us to deal less emotionally and more effectively with the crucial
social issue of who decides what behavior should be modified, as well as the
objectives and methods of that modification.
II. The Scientific Manipulation of Behavior
A. The Selection of Goals and the Scientific Method
Before discussing recent technological advances and the resulting "science"
of human behavior, it is necessary to consider an oft-stated but frequently ignored
maxim: the scientific method is an excellent way to discover the means to achieve
individual or societal goals, but science alone cannot tell us what goals to pursue.
This limitation, pointed out in contemporary times by G. E. Moore, 22 is valid
not only with respect to the physical sciences" but also with respect to the social
sciences in general and the behavioral sciences in particular.24 As Carl Rogers
urged in a debate with B. F. Skinner, any scientific endeavor requires a prior
subjective choice of the value that the scientific work is to serve.25 This value
choice, which brings the scientific work into being, always lies outside the endeavor itself and cannot be part of the science involved in that endeavor.2 6 For
example, if an educator desires to impart knowledge of the "three R's," behavioral science can provide information on how to best attain this objective.
If, on the other hand, the educator regards problem-solving ability as the goal
of education, the scientific method offers means by which to cultivate and reinforce this ability. Should the educator, however, wish to determine the better
or more desirable approach, the scientific method cannot help him unless he
supplies a third value, by reference to which he can assess the two competing
values. If the educator is concerned with college success, the scientific method
can determine which type of early training best facilitates the achievement of that
objective. In each case, however, the goal or value determining the direction of
a given scientific endeavor must lie outside that endeavor.
20 See also notes 16-19 infra and accompanying text.
21 Compare T. PARSONS, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY 129-54 (1964) (analysis
of schools as institutional environments capable of effecting large scale behavioral change in
those subject to the system).
22 G. E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 19 et seq. (1903); see also A. J. Ayer, Critique of
Ethics, in READINGS IN ETHICAL THEORY 391 (W. Sellars & J. Hospers eds. 1952); C. D.
Broad, Some of the Main Problems of Ethics, in READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 547
(H. Feigl & W. Sellars eds. 1949).
23 J. CONANT, MODERN SCIENCE AND MODERN MAN 66-67, 80-111 (1952); Kuhn The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS 622, 624 (W. Bishin &
C. Stone eds. 1972).
24 Rogers & Skinner, Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior: A Symposium, 124 SCIENCE 1057, 1061-63 (1956).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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B. BehauioralEngineering: Toward A New Technology
Recent advances in social learning theory and the applied technology of
behavior modification suggest that given a properly controlled environment behavioral engineers can influence the frequency, intensity, and duration of
specified target behaviors for individuals and social groups. 2 Moving from the
laboratory" to controlled environments ° and finally into community settings,"'
& 3
while simultaneously progressing from ratss2 and lower primates
as experimental
4
5
3
6
subjects to children, adults, and entire social systems, behavioral psychologists
have developed a potent technology for behavior change and control.
Though the application of learning theory to achieve behavioral change
often provokes heated attack, the principles employed are scarcely new. Indeed,
as noted earlier, the reason for the effectiveness of behavior modification is that it
uses-in systematic fashion-strategies as old as man himself.
Efforts to control inappropriate adult behavior to achieve compliance with
legal, religious, or community norms have historically focused on developing and
refining elaborate forms of coercive control 7 In behavioral terms, this forms a
strategy which shapes behavior by negative reinforcement or punishment. It is
premised on the principle that individuals will learn to avoid negative consequences-punishment, sense of guilt, social ostracism-and avoidance of unpleasant stimuli~s An example of a social institution operating on this principle
is the criminal justice system, which uses the threat of penal sanctions to deter
socially undesirable behavior.
This method of behavior control, however, has frequently failed to produce
satisfactory results. This is due in part to the imprecision with which the goals
have been defined and in part to the inconsistency with which the negative consequences have been dispensed. The systematic application of reinforcement is
necessary to achieve effective behavior modification. 9 Rewards and punishments
should ideally be dispensed on an established schedule as soon as the desired or
undesired behavior appears.4 9 Absent this immediate reinforcement, shaping
takes place slowly or not at all. An additional requirement is that the subject
understand which of his specific behaviors will lead to punishment or reward. 4'
This is not to say that negative reinforcement strategies are ineffective.
28

E.g., J.

MANN, CHANGING HUMAN BEHAVIOR

81-94, 97-106 (1965) [hereinafter cited

as MANNi.

29 Id. at 113-17.
30

Id.; Ferster, Transition from Animal Laboratory to Clinic, in SELECTED READINGS IN

BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION

15-20 (R. Ruskin ed. 1972).

31
32

See notes 65-72 intra and accompanying text.
Skinner, Some Relations Between Behavior Modification and Basic Research, in
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: ISSUES AND EXTENSIONS 2 (S. Bijou & E. Ribes-Inesta eds. 1972).
33 Id.

34
35
36
37

See notes 47-48, 66 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 42-43, 49-57 infra and accompanying text.

See notes 58-72 infra and accompanying text.
E.g., Schwitzgebel, Behavior Modification: Past, Present, and Future, in BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION: THE HUMAN EFFORT 3-6 (R. Bradfield ed. 1970).
38 Id. at 3-5; MANN, supra note 28, at 56-61.
39 MANN, suPra note 28, at 56-60; M. ARxAVA, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: A PROCEDURAL
Gums FOR SOCIAL WORxEas 22-24 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ARxAvA].
40 Id.
41 ARxAvA, supra note 39, at 32; BANDURA, supra note 15, at 564-67 (1969).
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Aversive techniques have successfully attained a wide variety of therapeutic
ends."2 Sexual behaviors, self-mutilation, cigarette smoking, alcohol abuse, compulsive stealing, and other relatively resistant behaviors can often be eradicated
or reduced through the use of aversive conditioning such as mild electric shocks.4 8
The notion of one human being consciously administering painful sensations to
another, however, is a highly dramatic one, and it is this form of behavior modification that has been most responsible for alerting the public and the courts to
the potential hazards of irresponsible behavioral engineering.44
In recent years, however, a noticeable shift has occurred in the strategy of
behavior manipulation as practiced by professional behavioral psychologists.
Relying heavily on the use of positive reinforcement and the principles of contingency management, behavioral psychologists have demonstrated remarkable
success in altering a wide variety of behaviors in both individuals and groups.4 5
As with negative reinforcement, this is no new discovery. The process whereby
individuals receive rewards (social approval, food, money) for doing "the right
thing" has been used by numerous cultures as a device for altering behavior. 8
Behavioral scientists are now attempting to systematically unravel the nuances of
reinforcement theory so as to obtain maximum effect. Target behaviors now
cover a wide range of man's experience. In children and adolescents, behavior
technology has altered speech dysfunction, school phobia, encopresis and enuresis,
seizures, self-injurious behavior, and oppositional character traits.4" Autistic
behavior, certain forms of learning disorder, and even nervous tics have been
successfully treated by application of behavior therapy."5 In the adult population,
the use of behavior technology has cured depression,49 phobias,5" and anxiety
reactions5 and has altered such diverse behaviors as compulsive gambling,"2
compulsive hand-washing, s hysterical retention of urine, 4 stage fright,ss sleep-

42 E.g., Feldman, Aversion Therapy for Sexual Deviations: A Critical Review, 65
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 65 (1966); Rachman & Teasdall, Aversion Therapy: An Appraisal,
in BEHAVIOR THERAPY 279 (C. Franks ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Rachman & Turner].
43 Rachman & Turner, suisra note 42, at 280-314.
44 See notes 85-99, 185-88 infra and accompanying text.
45 See notes 47-72 infra and accompanying text.
46 See A. SHERMAN, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 33-34 (1973);
L. KRASNER & L. ULLMAN, BEHAVIOR INFLUENCE AND PERSONALITY 140-45, 327-463 (1973).

47

Johnson & Katz, Using Parents as Change Agents for Their Children, 14 J. CHuD
181 (1973).

PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY

48

Gelfand & Hartmann, Behavior Therapy with Children, 69 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.

204

(1968).
49 Lewinsohn, Weinstein & Alper, A Behavioral Approach to the Group Treatment of
Depressed Persons, 26 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 525 (1970).
50 Andrews, Psychotherapy of Phobias, 66 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 455 (1966); Benson,
Systematic Desensitization in the Treatment of Phobic Reactions, 20 J. GENERAL EDUCATION
119 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bensoni.
51 Benson, supra note 50.
52 Barker & Miller, Aversion Therapy for Compulsive Gambling, 146 J. MENTAL DISEASE
285 (1968).
53 Bailey & Atchison, The Treatment of Compulsive Handwashing Using Reinforcement
Principles, 7 BEHAVIOR RESEARCH & THERAPY 327 (1969).

54 Cooper, Conditioning Therapy in Hysterical Retention of Urine, 111 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 575 (1965).
55 Kondas, Reduction of Examination Anxiety and "Stage Fright" by Group Desensitization and Relaxation, 5 BEHAVIOR RESEARCH & THERAPY 255 (1967).
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57
walking," and even the visual performance of functionally blind persons.
Although these classic applications of behavior therapy have normally been
conducted in one-to-one, behaviorist-patient contexts, attempts have been made
recently to apply behavior modification techniques to groups or entire populations. In 1961 Theodore Ayllon and Nathan Azrin began a pioneering project
that demonstrated the effectiveness of a "token economy" system in modifying
individual behavior on an institution-wide basis."' They carried out the project
in an Illinois state hospital ward of chronically psychotic female patients whose
prolonged hospitalization had resulted in behavior patterns of extreme apathy
and dependence.59 Tokens, which the patients could exchange for reinforcers
such as special foods, privacy, television time, and grounds privileges, were dispensed contingently in response to certain target behaviors.' The behavioral
objectives were to reverse the apathy and dependence of the patients and
eventually develop self-care and work skills.6 Brushing their own teeth, making
their own beds, and the performance of certain kitchen chores were reinforced by
awarding a designated number of tokens."
By determining the items or activities highly reinforcing to an individual
patient and then limiting access to those reinforcers, the managers of token
economy systems can systematically manipulate the environment to effect substantial and highly predictable changes in the behaviors of an institutionalized
patient." As the patient progresses, increasingly complex behaviors and additional skills can be required in order to earn tokens. The goal is to teach "behaviors which lead to social reinforcers from others," so that the new behavior
patterns will be reinforced and therefore maintained outside the institution.64
Use of these techniques is not limited, however, to institutional settings.
Although the community is less susceptible to control and manipulation, it offers
the advantages of greater freedom to the individual and less expense to the state,
while simultaneously avoiding the difficult transition from the institution to the
outside worid. Recent developments in the use of behavior therapy within family
56

Meyer, A Behavioral Treatment Approach to Sleepwalking Associated with Test
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 77TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
Ass'N 485 (1969).
57 Zimmerman & Grosz, "Visual" Performance of a Functionally Blind Person, 4 BEHAVIOR
RESEARCH & THERAPY 119 (1966). For accounts of the use of behavior therapy to alter other
forms of behavior see, e.g., Lazarus, The Treatment of a Sexually Inadequate Man, in CASE
STUDIES IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 243 (L. Ullman & L. Krasner eds. 1965); Burchard &
Tylor, The Modification of Delinquent Behavior through Operant Conditioning, 2 BEHAVIOR
RESEARCH & THERAPY 245 (1965); Keutzer, Lichtenstein & Mees, Modification of Smoking
Behavior: A Review, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 520 (1968); Liberman, Aversive Conditioning
of Drug Addicts, 6 BEHAVIOR R.ESEARCH & THERAPY 229 (1968).
58 Ayllon & Azrin, The Measurement and Reinforcement of Behavior of Psychotics, 8 J.
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR 357 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Ayllon & Azrin];

Anxiety, in

see also T.

AYLLON & N. AzRiN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY:
THERAPY AND REHABILITATION (1968).

A

MOTIVATIONAL

SYSTEM FOR

59 Ayllon & Azrin, supra note 58, at 358-59.
60 Id. at 357-58.
61 Id. at 382.
62 Id. at 368.
63 See generally Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies,
and the Law, 61 CAL. L. REv. 81 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wexler] for an excellent discussion of the techniques employed by managers of token economies and the legal problems
that arise from their use.
64 Paper presented by L. Krasner at Ciba Symposium on Learning and Psychology, London,
England (1968) (on file at law library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah).
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units indicate that a wide range of individual behavior can be controlled by the
systematic manipulation of the social environment.65 By training the significant
persons in an individual's life to respond to that individual in specific ways, a continuous influence can be exerted on his behavior. Those most influential with
the individual, such as parents, teachers, or spouse, can be trained to become
66
behavioral engineers for shaping his behavior.
Using similar principles of social reinforcement, a team of Salt Lake City
psychologists designed and put into effect a program offered to delinquent
juveniles and their families as an alternative to the existing juvenile justice
system."1 The psychologists used a "matching to sample" procedure which
First, they attempted to
focused on certain family parameters of behavior.'
define, for certain behavioral areas, the interaction patterns of "normal" families.
The investigators concluded that six family-related factors which contribute to
the development of deviant children are especially significant: (1) a lack of
structure within the home, (2) the unsystematic use of punishment, (3) frequent
periods of crisis-times when the child receives little positive reinforcement,
(4) reliance on coercion instead or reciprocity within the family, (5) deviant
parents, and (6) selective responsiveness on the part of the child, in which he
attends to either parent but not both, or responds more actively to influences
outside the home ("peer pollution").
It also appeared that marked differences existed between the speech patterns
of normal and delinquent families. Normal families, it was found, display
positive variability in their speech, which provides the opportunity for change,
for the introduction of new information, and for conflict resolution. Abnormal
families tended to demonstrate ritualistic, nondisrupted patterns of communication providing neither new information nor the possibility of change.6 " These
families also displayed conflict patterns such as "derailing comments" (topic

65

E.g., Stuart, Operant-InterpersonalTreatment for Marital Discord, 33 J. CONSULTING

& CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 675 (1969).

66 See Parsons & Alexander, Short-Term Family Intervention: A Therapy Outcome
Study, 41 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 195 (1973); G. R. Patterson & Y.
Redi, Two Facets of Social Systems, paper presented at Ninth Institute for Research in
Clinical Psychology, at the University of Kansas, April, 1967 (on file at law library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah). By training parents in behavior modification techniques, researchers have brought about marked changes in the behavior of children seen
on an out-patient basis. O'Leary, O'Leary & Becker, Modification of the Deviant Sibling
Interaction Pattern in the Home, 5 BEHAVIOR RESEARCH & THERAPY 113 (1967); Patterson
& Brodsky, A Behavior Modification Program for a Child with Multiple Problem Behaviors,
7 J. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 277 (1966). This method has been used successfully
in the treatment of schizophrenic and autistic children, e.g., Wolf, Risley & Mees. Application
of Operant Conditioning Procedures to the Behavior Problems of an Autistic Child, 1
as well as delinquent adolescents, Thorne,
BEHAVIOR RESEARCH & THERAPY 305 (1964),
Tharp & Wetzel, Behavior Research Report (Office of Juvenile Delinquency & Youth Development, H.E.W. Grants 65023, 66020) (1968).
67 See generally Alexander & Parsons, Short-Term Behavioral Intervention with Delinquent Families, 81 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 219 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Alexander &
Parsons].
68 Id. at 219-20.
69 See also B. MISHLER & N. WAXLER, INTERACTION IN FAMILIES (1968); Mishler &
Waxier, Family Interaction Processes and Schizophrenia: A Review of Current Theories, 11
MERRILL-PALMER Q. 269 (1965).

[Vol. 50:230]

BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION:

LEGAL LIMITATIONS

237

change) designed to avoid problem solution and ritualized aggressive comments
designed to injure others."
The hypotheses examined in this study reflected an assumption that the
variables responsible for creating delinquent families could be conceptualized
and systematically manipulated so as to reduce family disequilibrium and decrease the likelihood of further crisis situations. The matching-to-normality
procedure, after identifying the parameters of normal family functioning,
systematically shaped dysfunctional families in the direction of those parameters.
As the balance of mutual reinforcement among the family members was made
more equitable by therapeutic intervention, the families moved from "bedlam'"
to relatively low rates of disruptive behavior. At the same time, these families
increased the frequency and duration of speech, distributing talk time more
equitably and decreasing periods of silence."
Success was measured by the degree of similarity between the "ideal normal
family parameters" and the delinquent family. At the end of the experiment,
all families had become more like the "normal" standard than before. Follow-up
data indicate that these families also had significantly reduced rates of recidivism
in the juvenile courts, suggesting that they retained their "normal" patterns.7
The implications of this and similar programs are far reaching. On the positive side, this method can alter broad patterns of dysfunctional behavior without
the expense and risk that attend institutionalization. Moreover, clear enunciation of the target behaviors in the Salt Lake City program made possible continual monitoring of progress toward those targets. Both the ends and the means
were susceptible to fairly accurate evaluation. The inclusion of the families
subjected to treatment in the planning stages of the project further aided this
evaluation.
.Despite these advantages, the program is not without its troubling aspects.
One difficulty-common to all behavior modification programs--concerns its
use of goal-concepts such as "normal." With reference to individual or family
behavior, the problem is that terms such as "normal" or "deviant" have an irreducible value component that cannot be defined in a culture-free way.7 3 To
decide on "normal" juvenile behavior for purposes of a behavior-shaping
program, it is necessary to ask what standard shapes the definition of "normal."
Is it to be the "normal" Black or Chicano family, or the "normal" white middleclass family? Is it the "normal" California family, Massachusetts family, Georgia
family, or some composite "normal" American family?
Although science offers various definitions of "normality," it cannot tell
us which to pursue or even whether normality is desirable in itself, without
reference to some external, subjectively chosen value. 4 The problem is somewhat
simplified by the existence of a juvenile code, since "normal" can be operationally
70 See also Farina,Patterns of Role Dominance and Conflict in Parents of Schizophrenic
Patients, 61

71

J. ABNORMAL

AND

Socrs Psyo.

31 (1960).

Alexander & Parsons, supra note 67, at 220-21.

72 J.Alexander & B. Parsons, Short-Term Therapy and Recidivism Rates: A Two-Year

Follow-Up, paper presented to the Western Psychological Association, San Francisco, California
(1974) (on file at law library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah).
73 E.g., T. SZASz, Tim MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 52-72 (1961).
74 See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
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defined as that which does not violate the juvenile code. This does not resolve
the deeper dilemma, because compliance with the juvenile code is only one of
society's goals, and this goal must be balanced against others including the
preservation of personal liberty and individual differences.
The Salt Lake City experiment raises an even more fundamental danger
with regard to ethnic minorities and the poor. Once an individual has been
adjudged delinquent-thereby giving the state the power to intervene-the
onus is entirely on the individual to become "normal." 7 But it is a truism of
behavioral science that aberrant behavior is often simply a normal response to
abnormal conditions."6 Once the state has a ready device for shaping individuals,
it becomes easy to overlook the fact that the environment may be the root cause of
the individual's problem. By focusing attention on the abnormal individual to
the exclusion of his social environment, it is easy to "adjust away" sources of
complaint that left alone might have resulted in pressure for societal reform.
That a small minority of unmonitored technicians currently carry out just such
"adjustments," often against the will of the person whose behavior is being
modified, suggests a need for greater legislative and judicial attention in this
area.
III. Judicial and Administrative Regulation of Behavior Modification
A. Assessment of Methods
Self-modification of behavior and consensual modification of another's
behavior pose few problems for the law, provided the target behaviors are not
forbidden conduct and consent is knowingly and freely given. Adults "consent"
to having their behavior modified every time they enroll in a school or training
program, engage a psychiatrist or marriage counselor, or attend religions services.
For persons highly motivated to change a behavior pattern, methods that
involve little or no intrusiveness are available. The work of Joseph Cautela has
demonstrated that positive and negative reinforcers can be administered to a
willing patient simply by asking him to imagine a pleasant or unpleasant event,
object, or circumstance.7 7 Gautela has effectively treated patients anxious to
eliminate behaviors such as alcoholism, homosexuality, overeating, and excessive
smoking by suggesting that they imagine themselves becoming nauseated and
vomiting as they are about to encounter the object of their habit.7 8 Alternatively,
the patient can imagine himself refusing the stimulus and then receiving a
"reward." The reward can be "winning $25,000 in a contest," "skiing down a
mountain feeling exhilarated," or any of the patient's high preference items."'
Patients can practice on their own as a self-control procedure, and frequently do
daily "homework assignments."" Purely voluntary procedures such as Gautela's,
75 CI. L.
76 Id.

KRASNER & L. ULLMAN, BEHAVIOR INFLUENCE A D PERSONALITY

77

Cautela, Covert Reinforcement, 1 BEHAVIOR THERAPY 1, 36-38 (1970).

78
79
80

Id. at 35.
Id. at 36-39.
Id. at 43.

487 (1973).
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involving neither intrusiveness nor coercion, are legally unassailable. But these
procedures are obviously unavailable when the patient will not or cannot use
his imaginative powers as suggested by the therapist.
Constitutional questions arise only when the state has a right to modify an
individual's behavior by coercion and the individual cannot or will not give
knowing consent.' Ordinarily, the severity and intrusiveness of the methods
necessary for a given behavioral change are a function of the amount of resistance
the subject offers to the change. ' If resistance is strong, mild measures will
generally fail. On the other hand, for a patient strongly motivated to change his
pattern of behavior, drastic therapies are rarely necessary. A patient's resistance
may be either deliberate or nondeliberate (such as deeply ingrained behavior or
habits). Moreover, objections to treatment may relate to either the methods or
the target behaviors. Most law students consent to the target behavior of
acquiring skills of legal analysis. A student may not in fact consent to writing a
given paper or taking a given final examination; but so long as these methods are
reasonably related to the development of the target behavior, the student is
deemed to have consented to the methods as well.
It is with respect to techniques performed on unwilling subjects that the law
has begun to impose limits on the scientific manipulation of behavior. Although
case law is sparse, legal limits already exist not only on the use of aversive techniquess' but also on the use of positive reinforcement.8 4
In Knecht v. Gillnan,5 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared an aversive drug therapy program to be cruel and unusual punishment.
The drug apomorphine had been used at the Iowa Security Medical Facility as
an aversive conditioner in a behavior modification program. When injected into
the bloodstream, apomorphine induces vomiting, high blood pressure, and
palpitations of the heartya Inmates received the drug-without a doctor's
specific order-following every act of wilful disobedience." ' The court held that
such use of the drug violated the eighth amendment. Characterizing the drug's
use as "treatment" did not remove it from constitutional scrutiny, since the use
of the drug amounted to a form of punishment. In order for the institution to
continue to use the drug, it was required to obtain the consent of each inmate
for each use and to advise each patient of his right to discontinue the program
at any time." Each administration of the drug would require authorization by
81 In earlier years, courts were reluctant to intrude upon the realm of "medical judgment," and review of treatment programs adopted by mental institutions was rarely given,
see Wexler, supra note 63, at 91 and sources cited therein. Judicial deference seems to be
coming to an end, however, as courts are beginning to scrutinize living conditions and treatment modalities that prevail in these institutions. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 '(M.D. Ala. 1972); Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County, July 10, 1973)
[1972-74 Transfer Binder], CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 17,493; Wexler, supra note 63, at 91; see
also Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. Rav. 289 (1972).
82 A. GOLDSTEIN, K HELLER & L. SECHREST, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
BEHAVIOR CH31ANGE 146 (1966).
83 See notes 85-99 infra and accompanying text.
84 See notes 100-03 infra and accompanying text.
85 488 F.2d 1136 (8th 'Cir. 1973).
86 Id. at 1137.

87
88

Id.
Id. at 1140.
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a physician and administration by either a physician or a nurse. The court also
limited use of the drug to offending conduct personally observed by a staff
member. 9
The Ninth Circuit recently reviewed a similar program of aversive therapy
90
In Mackey, a prisoner challenged his forced particiin Mackey u. Procunier.
pation in a program that used the drug anectine, which produces sensations of
suffocation and drowning." The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
dismissal for failure to state a claim, holding that use of the drug might be found
to be "experimental." 92 If experimental and administered without the prisoner's
consent, issues of cruel and unusual punishment or "impermissible tinkering with
the mental process" might arise. 93
Although both Knecht and Mackey arose in prison settings, other holdings
suggest that the eighth amendment's guarantee also applies to those civilly committed for mental illness."' In Wyatt v.Stickney,9" a landmark case in the
development of the law relating to the mentally ill, a federal district court placed
several limitations on the use of behavior modification techniques. Use of these
techniques was held to require the consent of the patient, guardian, or next of
kin, after opportunities for consultation with independent specialists and legal
6
counsel, and then only with the approval of a human rights committee.
Electric shock was permissible only "in extraordinary circumstances to prevent
self-mutilation leading to repeated and possibly permanent physical damage to
the resident and only after alternative techniques have failed."9 " Neither medication, seclusion, nor physical restraint could be used as punishment devices.98
Legitimate "time out" or segregation procedures were permissible as punishment,
but only under "close and direct professional supervision as a technique in
behavior-shaping programs." '9
With respect to positive reinforcement techniques, Wyatt's impact should
be equally broad. Positive reinforcement-the selective rewarding of target
behaviors--is generally recognized as the most powerful technique in the arsenal
Application of this technique to particular patients,
of the behavior modifier.'
however, is often limited by the cost of continuing to supply the desired reinToken economy systems are therefore substituted, in which access
forcement.'
89

Id.

90

477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).

91 Id. at 878; see Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 616, 636-38

(1972) for a description of the effects of the drug anectine.
92 477 F.2d at 878.
93

Id.

94 E.g., Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys
Training Schools v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Lollis v. Department of Social
Services, 322 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States ex rel Wolfersdorff v.
Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
95 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
96 Id. at 400.
97 Id. at 401.
98 Id. at 400-01.
99 Id. at 400.
100 See notes 45-72 supra and accompanying text.
101 Some behavior modifiers have solved this problem with private patients by negotiating
contracts with them requiring the patients to place money or items of value in trust. E.g.,
R. STUART & B. DAViS, SLIM CHANCE IN A FAT WORLD: BEHAVIORAL CONTROL OF OBESITY
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to privileges and items of comfort is made contingently available."0 2 By specifying the minimum requirements of a constitutionally adequate environment,
Wyatt limits the use of many potentially powerful reinforcers. When such items
as screens for privacy, bedside tables, and physical exercise are a matter of
right, ' 3 these items are beyond the reach of behavioral psychologists as contingent rewards.
This result has caused concern that Wyatt may impede the work of therapists with patients whose condition renders them unresponsive to any but the
most basic of reinforcers.' 4 The opinion does, however, permit "unusual or
hazardous treatment procedures" upon a showing that due process requirements
have been met and that the procedures are therapeutically necessary.'0 5 Although
these requirements may make application of behavior modification methods
more cumbersome, this is a small price for ensuring that drastic methods will
only be used as a last resort. As Professor David Wexler has suggested, Wyatt
will probably have the beneficial effect of stimulating behaviorists to search for
new reinforcers that can be used without encroaching on patients' rights.0 6
A number of cases, grouped under the rubric of the "right to refuse treatment," suggest that such a search may well be constitutionally required.1 0r Once
a person has been involuntarily institutionalized or designated for compulsory
treatment, the right to refuse treatment becomes the right to the least restrictive
treatment alternative.'
Such cases often present agonizing choices between
the individual's right to refuse unwanted treatment, society's right to be free
from disruptive or dangerous behavior, and the financial burden of prolonged
custodial care. Sanchez u. Ciccone, 0, for example, was a suit filed by the
National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of certain prisoners who had been involuntarily placed in a behavior modification
program called START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitation Training)."'
A project of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, START was located at the Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. The inmates selected for
START came from other federal penal institutions at which their disruptive
behavior had resulted in prolonged periods of solitary confinement."' The
(1972). These items are then returned contingent on the patientes displaying the target behaviors. If the behaviors are not produced, the agreement usually provides that the objects
are forfeited to charity.

102 See notes 58-64 supra and accompanying text.
103 344 F. Supp. at 402, 404.
104 E.g., Wexler, supra note 63, at 101.
105 344 F. Supp. at 402.
106 Wexler, supra note 63 at 103.

107

E.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971);

Stowers v. Ardmore Acres Hospital, 19 Mich. App. 115, 172 N.W.2d 497 (1969); In re
Brooks, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E. 2d 435 '(1965). But see People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,
411 IlL 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
108 See text accompanying notes 151-55 infra; see also text accompanying notes 8-21 supra.
109 Nos. 20182-4, 3061-4 (W.D. Mo. 1973), decided sub nom. Clonce v. Richardson, 15

Calm. L. REP. 2504 (1974).
110

For a general description of the workings of Project START, see Steinman, The Case

of the Frightened Convict, 217 THE NATION
Convict].

(Dec.

3, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Frightened

111 Coordinator of Mental Health Services, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, OPsPATIoNs MEMo.
7300.128, PROCEDURE FOR PROCESSING PARTICIPANTS INTO PROJECT START (SPECAI TREATMENT AND REHABLxrrATrvE TRAININO) 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as START MEMo].
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Bureau of Prisons had amassed compelling evidence that continued confinement
in solitary tends to produce psychological disintegration due to sensory deprivation and lack of human interaction.112 It was claimed that since the prisoners
had demonstrated unwillingness to participate in less intrusive forms of therapy
and since their behavior was disruptive to the prison regime, there were only
two alternatives: continued psychological deterioration in solitary confinement
or involuntary placement in a program designed to eliminate the disruptive
behavior." 3
START was designed for "that element of the prison population which
has chronically demonstrated inability to effectuate adherence to established
regulations."1"' The program sought to develop "behavioral and attitudinal
changes in offenders who have not adjusted satisfactorily to institutional settings.""' 5 Prison periodicals" 6 and the popular press,"' however, noted the high
proportion of Blacks and Chicanos selected for participation and criticized the
program as a means of "dehumanizing" those who protested against unjust and
barbaric prison conditions.
START was based on a theory of "status systems."' 1 8 The program involved a number of levels, each characterized by a stated set of privileges and
responsibilities." 9 As the inmate demonstrated improved adaptation, he was
rewarded by advancement to a higher, more privileged, level. 2 ° Even the highest
levels had fewer privileges than life in the regular institution; the prisoner was
2
thus led to perceive a return to his former prison as a positive good.1 '
22
START had three levels.'
Upon transfer to the program, an inmate was
placed in Level I. There the prisoner was allowed only a few basic personal
articles, was permitted very little time outside his cell, and was given little exercise. 22 In order to progress to Level II, the prisoner had to do such things as
keep his room neat, achieve a high cooperation rating, and achieve a certain
24
level of self-care and cleanliness.
Some prisoners refused to cooperate even at Level I. At least three of the
original group of transferees staged a 65-day "fast for rights."'' 25 Even after
they discontinued their fast, they were uncooperative with program officials who
responded by creating a status level even more restrictive than Level 1.126 A
112 Working sheets for START MEMo, supra note 115 (enclosed in letter to Sanford
Rosen, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund Litigation Director, from
Arpiar Saunders, Jr., staff attorney, National Prison Project, Feb. 27, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Working Sheets].
113 Id.; Frightened Convict, supra note 110.
114 Working sheets, supra note 112.
115 START MEMO, supra note 111, at 1.
116 Prisoner's Digest International, Sept.-Oct., 1972, at 4, col. 1.
117 Frightened Convict, supra note 110.
118 START MEMo, supra note 111, at 6-7; Working Sheets, supra note 112.
119 START MEMo, supra note 111.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Letter to Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund from inmate,
Segregation Unit, United States Penitentiary, Marion, Ill., Jan. 24, 1973.
126 Id.
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staff attorney from the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union described conditions in the new sublevel as "shocking.' 127 During a visit
to Project START, the attorney observed participants shackled by their arms
and legs and chained to their steel beds.'
He learned that prisoners had been
forced to eat with both hands shackled and had had difficulty obtaining assistance
from the staff in removing the chains to perform necessary bodily functions.'29
The prisoners had been placed in sublevel I because of their "non-cooperative
attitude,"'3 ° without ever being charged or allowed to appear before a disciplinary committee. 3'
Shortly thereafter the National Prison Project filed Sanchez v. Ciccone," 2
which is still in litigation. The allegations include cruel and unusual punishment,
excessively rigorous conditions of confinement, failure to inform inmates of
expected behaviors, and the deprivation of absolute rights by treating them as
contingent. Project START may well be declared unconstitutional, fraught as
it is with legal difficulties."
Even so, it illustrates some of the dilemmas that
"least restrictive alternative" analysis introduces when behavior modification
technology is sought to be applied to hardened offenders. Solitary confinement
34
yet
has a demonstrated tendency to cause severe psychological deterioration;
Project START, according to prison officials the only practicable alternative, " 5
violates basic human rights of prisoners, if only for a limited period of time.
It is here that scientific expertise reaches its limit and basic societal judgments must be made.'36 These judgments involve balancing the individual, institutional, and societal values involved. Courts and legislatures are capable of
rendering these judgments; the weighing of conflicting interests has been one
of their historic functions. 7 In fact, it is important to note that those who
advocate, market, and operate the programs are not necessarily qualified to
make these judgments. As judicial opinions have stated, those who administer
the programs tend to have their own biases and values-such as ease of operation
and custodial efficiency"--and these values may well conflict with the values
of individual rehabilitation. Given the critical nature of the rights at stake
and the demonstrated propensity of "total" institutions to give short shrift to
127 Letter to Dr. P. J. 'Ciccone, Director, Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Mo., from Arpiar Saunder, Jr., staff attorney, National Prison Project, Feb. 26, 1973.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Nos. 20182-4, 3061-4 (W.D. Mo. 1973), decided sub nom. Clonce v. Richardson, 15
CIm. L. RaP. 2504 (1974).
133 As of this writing, the Bureau of Prisons has discontinued the START program, allegedly because of its high cost. In Clonce v. Richardson, 15 Caram. L. Rp. 2504 (1974), the
court held that this rendered moot all constitutional issues except procedural due process. The
court further held that the transfer of prisoners to START without any sort of a hearing
violated due process. Id. at 2505.
134 See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
135 See notes 111-15 sufira and accompanying text.
136 The existence of such a limitation is not peculiar to behavior modification; rather, it
is a characteristic of every scientific endeavor. See notes 22-27 supra and accompanying text.
137 E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (regulation of abortion); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) *(search and seizure); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138 (1948) (economic regulation); see Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE
L. J. 1424 (1962).

138

E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 396, 402, 407 (1972).
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the rights of those committed to their care 139 continued deference to scientific
authority seems ill-advised. If courts and legislatures are to perform their historic functions, they must assume the role of ultimate arbiters of the legitimacy
of the means used by those who seek to apply the new behavior technologies
directly to the human spirit.
B. Assessment of Goals
As with similar programs of compulsory behavior modification, Project
START is undoubtedly assailable on its methods. But it is arguably even more
assailable on its goals and the procedures by which those goals are established.
When a subject knowingly and freely consents to a behavior modification
program, he has a voice in deciding the goals he wants to pursue.14 This is the
best guarantee that the goal-setting process will preserve individual and cultural
differences. There is a growing trend to seek consent from those civilly incarcerated before beginning a behavior modification program141 and at least the
beginnings of such a trend for the criminally incarcerated.' 42 In the case of
children and the mentally ill, it is now recognized that even greater precautions
are necessary and that obtaining a standard consent form may not be sufficient.
139 See notes 8-14, 85-99, 109-35 supra and accompanying text.
140 See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Wayne County, July 10, 1973) [1972-74 Transfer Binder], CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 17,493 for an
excellent discussion of legal consent to treatment.
141 See notes 95-106 supra and accompanying text.
142 See notes 85-94 supra and accompanying text. Perhaps the most eloquent argument
for affording prisoners the greatest possible opportunity for making choices concerning their
own rehabilitation was recently made in an open letter to Governor Daniel P. Walker of
Illinois. Written by "the men and women confined in the correctional institutions in Illinois,"
the letter urged:
We in all sincerity are convinced that the proper posture for correctional
institution officials regarding the rehabilitation of confined persons should be to encourage inmates to make decisions at every possible turn. It is an indisputable
fact that we need guidance. We need to learn how to make responsible decisions
in our everyday lives. Proper guidance and the opportunity to test the effectiveness
of this guidance in our rehabilitation is lacking in the present policy ...
Improvement in our decision-making abilities represents the crux of rehabilitation. It is...
by emphasizing decision-making in the rehabilitative process and guiding the
individual to make proper decisions that the administration can claim that when
he returns to the community he will be able to make responsible decisions. If,
however, as is now the case, the individual is denied any role in decision-making
during his incarceration, he will inevitably become a moral cripple, incapable of
making responsible decisions. . . . Furthermore, a very significant number, in fact
the overwhelming majority of us were not incarcerated as hardened criminals and
very few if any as absolutely non-redeemable. By and large we are men and women
who have accepted imprisonment as punitive remuneration for deeds resulting from
our making poor decisions, and who have opted for redemption, a redemption that
while paying debts will allow us to grow and that will allow us to develop a proper
understanding respecting the lives, rights, and property of others. Most of us enter
prison with prayers, hope, and determination to become . . . better human beings
than we were when we entered. It is this . . . hope that even now moves us to
seek to address the problems of rehabilitation, the problems involved in redirecting
the values of men and women so as to make them productive members of society...
. We believe as Dostoevski that the quality of a society can be determined by
the state of its prisons inasmuch as prisons reflect the primary values of a society
and are accorded the responsibility of reorienting and transforming those individuals
who have transgressed its mores and laws into responsible members of society
once again.
"An Open Letter to Daniel P. Walker," 3 Chicago Connections Newsletter, No. 1, at 6 (1974).
See also note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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The Department of Health, Education, and Welfares recently promulgated
& ' suggests
"Policies and Procedures for the Protection of Human Subjects"
that in the case of children, prisoners, and others subject to coercive control,
even consent of the subject and his next of kin may be inadequate. The establishment of a human rights commission along the lines suggested by the Wyatt
court 4 may therefore be advisable in institutions whose functions result in the
modification of human behavior. Because such commissions set behavioral
objectives, they must comprise a true cross section of the community.'45 In
particular, such commissions should include substantial representation from the
minority communities, especially Blacks and Chicanos, since these groups are
disproportionately represented among the institutionalized. 4 6 Unless this is
done, behavior modification programs may appear to be vehicles whereby members of cultural and racial minorities are "reprogrammed" and indoctrinated
into the value system of the dominant social group."' It is difficult to believe
that the involuntary participants in Project START actually preferred solitary
confinement to the relative freedom of Level II, unless their resistance is understood as a function of the goal-setting aspect of the program. Significantly, of
the inmates who refused to cooperate at the lowest level of START, more than
half were either Blacks or Chicanos. 48 Although no empirical proof exists, it
seems reasonable to suspect that the fear of being programmed in a way that
would blur
their class or racial identities played a part in their refusal to co49
operate.'
There are essentially two types of judicial restrictions emerging from recent
cases relating to the permissible range of goals set by behavior modification
programs. The first restriction is substantive due process requiring that involuntary treatment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the state's
In the case of mentally ill patients who have been
coercive power is applied.'
civilly committed, this requirement has been interpreted to mean a right to
rehabilitative treatment. 5 ' Recent opinions have held that this includes a right
to the least restrictive treatment method available, considering the circumstances
and the reason for incarceration. 5 2 In Kaimowitz v.Department of Mental
143 38 Fed. Reg. 31738, 31745 (1973).
144 See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
145 See notes 74-76, 117 supra and accompanying text.
146 For example, in federal prisons nearly half of the inmates are non-white. Frightened
Convict, supra note 110.
147 Cf. Heldman, Social Psychology Versus the First Amendment Freedoms, Due Process
Liberty, and Limited Government, 4 CUMB.-SAM. L. Rav. 1, 18-40 (1973).
148 Of a total of 15 involuntary participants three were brown, seven were black and five
were white. Working sheets, supra note 112.
149 The aberrant behavior that each START participant exhibited in the prison from
which he came may also have been at least in part a normal reaction to abnormal conditions.
See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text. The refusal of several prisoners to cooperate
with START may have been attributable to START's obvious potential for destroying the
ability or desire to protest against conditions seen as inhumane and in need of reform. See

notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
150 E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).

151 E.g., McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373, 387, 391, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
152 E.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wyatt v. Stickney, supra
note 151, at 373, 379, 396; see also Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wexler,
Scoville, et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona,
13 Amz. L. Rv.1, 14046 (1971).
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Health,'53 for example, a three-judge Wayne County court held that an involuntarily confined mental patient could not give legally valid consent to experimental
psychosurgery because of the nature of the operation and the coercion inherent
Moreover, the state's interest could justify only the alteration
in confinement.'
of those aspects of the patient's personality that pertained to aggression and
only to the extent necessary for the protection of the patient and the public.1 5
The proposed psychosurgical operation satisfied none of these limitations.
A second variety of judicial restrictions on goals derives from the personal
guarantees in the Bill of Rights, particularly freedom of speech, religion, and
association; the right to privacy; and the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. It is unlikely that the state (whether acting as parens patriae or
exercising the police power) could ever justify an attempt to alter or eradicate
religious or political beliefs. Although certain limited restrictions on first amendment freedoms have been tolerated where the state has proved a compelling
interest,' 56 these situations are few in number and have been increasingly narrowed by the courts.
With few exceptions, persons not incarcerated are free to believe in and
practice unorthodox religions.5 7 A decade ago, the Supreme Court ruled that
this right also applies behind bars when it reversed a lower court's dismissal of a
Black Muslim's claim for relief from denial of access to religious publications.'
In a similar case, the Court found a valid claim for relief on the part of a Buddhist who alleged that he had been placed in solitary confinement for sharing
his religious views with others. 55
Lower courts have extended these decisions to validate other claims for
religious freedom within prisons. In Brown v. Peyton, 6' for example, the Fourth
Circuit held that a prisoner who had been denied access to the publications
Muhammed Speaks and Message to the Blackman and who had been denied
permission to conduct prayer meetings with other members of his sect stated a
valid claim for deprivation of his civil rights. A prisoner, the court held, "does
Even though prison
not shed his first amendment rights at the prison portals."''
authorities have a legitimate interest in rehabilitating prisoners and may limit
their freedom to promote their rehabilitation, the state must still prove a compelling interest in order to suppress religious practices and communications.'"
Without a showing that the practices presented a threat of danger to other prisoners, there was insufficient state interest to prohibit those practices."
153 No. 73-19434 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County July 10, 1973) [1972-74 Transfer
Binder], CCH Pov. L. REP. l 17,493.
154 Id. at 29-37 [1972-74 Transfer Binder], CCII Pov. L. REP. at 17,297.
155 Id. at 36-38 [1972-74 Transfer Binder], CCII Pov. L. Rap,. at 17,298.
156 E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (advocacy of violence); Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (freedom of association);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of speech); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (freedom of religion).
157 E.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
158 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
159 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).

160

437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971).

161
162
163

Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1231.

Id.
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The first amendment also provides the basis for decisions sustaining a right

to protest incarceration. In Sostre v. McGinniss,'" the Second Circuit allowed
the curtailment of certain mailing privileges for the purpose of controlling contraband and preventing conspiratorial communications between prisoners and
persons on the outside. It held, however, that prison officials may not edit letters
addressed to courts, public officials, attorneys, or newspapers when the subject is
the illegality of the prisoner's conviction or the conditions of incarceration.'
Even within prison walls, freedom of expression has obtained judicial
solicitude. Fortune Society v. McGinnis6 6 arose out of an attempt by prison
officials to ban a prison reform newsletter. The court declared that "only a
compelling state interest centering about prison security, or a clear and present
danger of a breach of discipline,..
can justify curtailment of a prisoner's con-

stitutional rights."' 67
In Carothers u. Follette,"e a prisoner alleged that he had been punished
and locked in solitary confinement due to a letter he had written to the commissioner of corrections complaining about the prison administration. The court
held that punishment or even the threat of punishment would have a chilling
effect on a prisoner's first amendment right to voice dissatisfaction.'" The court
concluded that any prison regulation or practice restricting a prisoner's freedom
of expression beyond that enjoyed by other citizens must be necessarily related
7
to some justifiable purpose of imprisonment.Y
In re Mannino... concerned both free speech and free association. Here a
California appellate court held invalid a parole provision forbidding an anti-war
activist from speaking to any kind of gathering or printing any essay in any
publication. Mannino had been found guilty of assault on a police officer during
an anti-war demonstration. The court found that the petitioner's writing had
neither a direct relationship to his crime nor any relation to his future potential
for criminality. Freedom of speech, the court declared, is constitutionally protected and cannot be criminal "aside from some vice in its content."'' 7 2 The court
also struck down parole conditions forbidding Mannino from joining any organization which advocated social change. As with the ban on speech, there was
no showing that the parolee's membership or participation in an
organization7
as opposed to his lack of self-control-caused his transgression.1 3
Although drawn primarily from the heavily litigated area of prisoners'
rights, these first amendment cases impose significant limitations on the target
behaviors or goals that any state sponsored behavior modification program may
set.' Unorthodox or unpopular religious, political, or social beliefs may not be
164 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
165
166

Id. at 200.
319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

167 Id. at 904.
168 314 F. Supp. 1014 '(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
169 Id. at 1022.
170 Id. at 1024.
171 14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971).
172 Id. at 964, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
173 Id. at 964, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
174 Courts appear to be unanimous that the status of the civilly incarcerated can never
justifiably be lower than that of the prisoner, since in the case of the former no act of moral
culpability has been committed. See, e.g., Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972);
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suppressed; conditioning may not stifle dissatisfaction with institutional conditions.
Closely associated with first amendment rights are the various rights subsumed under the "right to privacy.""' 5 Although this right originated in the
Brandeis dissent in Olmstead v. United States,"' it has recently been applied in
cases involving bodily or psychological integrity. In Roe v. Wade, and Doe v.
Bolton,"' the Supreme Court held that a woman's right to privacy extends far
enough to include her right to an abortion. In Mackey v. Procunier,"9 a federal
court-presumably with privacy in mind-spoke of an "impermissible tinkering
with the mental processes"' 80 in a case dealing with aversive drug conditioning.
Kaimowitz also speaks of the right to privacy as incorporating the protection of
private thought:

"Intrusion into one's intellect . . . is an intrusion into one's

constitutionally protected right of privacy. If one is not protected in his
thoughts .. .then the right of privacy becomes meaningless."''
Finally, the eighth amendment limits what can be done in the name of
punishment or treatment. Traditionally used to protect against physical punishment intentionally inflicted,' 8 ' the amendment has been extended to a number
of noncriminal areas in which punishment is effected by other than physical
means.' The Supreme Court has declared that the interest served by the eighth
amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.'
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has recently been
applied to persons forcibly administered behavior-altering drugs in mental hospi8 a federal court found the eighth amendment
tals.'
In Holt v.Sarver,"'
applicable to inhumane prison conditions described as "shocking to the conscience.""'
In declaring these conditions unconstitutional, the court described the amendment as a flexible guarantee that "tends to broaden as society tends to pay more
regard to human decency and dignity and becomes, or likes to think that it
becomes, more humane."'"
As courts begin to focus on the goals of treatment and rehabilitation programs, the right to privacy and the protection against cruel and unusual punishment will find increased application. One area in which they may find use
Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972); Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
175 For a recent effort to catalogue these rights, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-15
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
176 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
177 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
179 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
180 Id. at 878.
181 Kaimowitz v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, No. 73-19434, at 38
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County July 10, 1973) [1972-74 Transfer Binder], CCH Pov. L. REP.
117,493.
182 See Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Cannon v. Willingham,
358 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1966); Owens v. Aldridge, 311 F. Supp. 667 (W. D. Okla. 1970).
183 E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (deprivation of citizenship for desertion in
wartime held cruel and unusual punishment).
184 Id. at 100.
185
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309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 380.
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concerns the demand-increasingly heard from minority groups-that rehabilitative, therapeutic, and educational programs respect cultural differences. That
the deprivation of one's cultural identity may be as great a punishment as deprivation of citizenship is incontrovertible.' 89 The prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment and the right to privacy are two constitutional grounds available to protect against such deprivation.
IV. Conclusion
Man's knowledge of the principles of human behavior has expanded so
rapidly that it is now safe to call this body of knowledge a science. As Goethe's
Faust attests, however, increased knowledge is often a mixed blessing.'90 Because
we now have the technology, we will use it to study our present-largely nonscientific - systems of individual and social control. When these systems are
approached from the viewpoint of behavioral science, it is obvious that they
could be "better."' 9' The drastic effects of solitary confinement, for example,
189 Accordingly, preservation of diversity requires the inclusion of hitherto excluded
groups, not only with respect to scientific uses of behavior modification, but nonscientific ones
as well. Their inclusion must take place at all levels at which behavior modification policy is
formulated, from Congress to the local institution and its human rights commission. At the
same time, there needs to be discussion of the appropriate size and level of the governmental
units to be entrusted with goal setting for institutions. It may well appear that many goals,
such as law enforcement, are primarily local in their impact; if so, goals might profitably be
set by communities of interest smaller than those presently charged with that responsibility.
Entrusting goal-setting to representative groups from the community to be served by the
institution not only helps ensure that minority values are preserved, but minimizes the likelihood that institutional values will be permitted to override individual and societal concerns.
If it should appear, in a certain community, that crime or mental illness are necessary byproducts of a defective environment, then it is useless--or worse-to pretend that reconditioning damaged individuals serves any long-term purpose. Local residents are best equipped to
make judgments about the relative contributions various environmental factors make to the
human problems being treated, and are best able to check the technician's tendency to see
dysfunction purely in individual terms. Whether more or less effort should go toward providing
individual therapy or improving social conditions is a choice-of-goals problem that is best
addressed by responsive groups who comprise a representative cross section of the community.
190 Indeed, perhaps the greatest potential difficulty with behavior science, from a philosophical and humanistic viewpoint, lies in its view of man. The way man views himself
tends to dictate what he becomes. If man sees himself as controlled by external, environmental
factors-and it is hard not to come to this conclusion when the environment is harsh or
difficult to change-he acts as though he is so determined. If man thinks he is free, he acts
as though he is. If man comes to view himself as a stimulus-response creature, he will also
become that. The challenge, then, will be to use behavior modification to free man from the
shackles of habit and unwanted behavior patterns, without permitting behavior modification
to become a way of life.
191 Another aspect of the dilemma described above, see note 190 supra, is the tendency
of behaviorism to promote a reductionist attitude toward human nature. One can approach
any object, a painting for example, from a number of perspectives. One can study the chemical
composition of the paint, analyze the colors with respect to the spectrum, or explore the
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are well known and documented. As a society we will soon feel we can do better
than that. Not to attempt an improvement will be viewed as tacit acceptance
of the present systems that modify behavior nonscientifically, but modify it nonetheless. The following comments are offered with the expectation that the use
and power of behavioral science will increase and with the hope that man will
use that power wisely.
We can no longer continue to ignore behavioral science by regarding it as
a personal aberration of B. F. Skinner. On the contrary, we must include present
nonscientific behavioral control systems in our scrutiny. Legal controls should
not center around an unrealistic absolute right to refuse treatment, but around
a requirement of full disclosure with the attendant right of the individual to
select the least restrictive alternative. If the knowing and willing consent of the
subject cannot be obtained to what the state considers the least restrictive alternative, a decision to proceed should be made only following a proceeding governed by due process requirements and approval by a human rights committee.
At the hearing, the individual should have the right to counsel and access to an
independent specialist. Judicial review should be available in all cases. Once
target behaviors and the proposed methods for their attainment have been agreed
upon, the progress of the individual toward these targets must be closely monitored, not only to ensure progress but also to prevent undesirable side effects.
Minimum standards for certification of behaviorists should be established.
That we are all behavior modifiers to some extent will make the definition of
"behaviorist" more difficult but not impossible. Mechanisms for peer rating and
review should be set up so that a behaviorist who violated accepted norms of
practice would be subject to censure by his profession.'92 A code of ethics for
behavior modifiers is also badly needed.
The procedures by which goals are set must be revised. This task can no
longer be left to "science," nor to any other single group. Goal-setting is a function to be performed by representative bodies reflecting the diversity of our
society.
Finally, the judiciary must expand its scrutiny over programs of behavioral
control 3 to ensure the preservation of a constitutionally protected right to dissent
as well as to protect the right to retain one's own identity even while undergoing
rehabilitative treatment.

192 One professional has suggested that these mechanisms will be necessary to ensure that
"the behavior modifier who is unable to demonstrate that his techniques [are] of therapeutic
benefit to the patient, and [are] of greater benefit than alternative and less extreme measure,
will . . . find himself subject to . . . aversive consequences." S. Braun, Ethical Issues in
Behavior Modification, paper presented to Annual Convention of the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Miami Beach, Florida, Dec. 1973 (on file with Stephen H. Braun,
Director, Social Learning Division, Arizona State Hospital, 2500 E. Van Buren St., Phoenix,
Arizona).
193 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.

